Can free will emerge from determinism in quantum theory? by Brassard, Gilles & Raymond-Robichaud, Paul
ar
X
iv
:1
20
4.
21
28
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
0 A
pr
 20
12
Can Free Will Emerge from
Determinism in Quantum Theory?
Gilles Brassard and Paul Raymond-Robichaud
“What is proved by impossibility proofs is lack of imagination” — John Bell
“Imagination is more important than knowledge” — Albert Einstein
Abstract Quantum Mechanics is generally considered to be the ultimate the-
ory capable of explaining the emergence of randomness by virtue of the quan-
tum measurement process. Therefore, Quantum Mechanics can be thought
of as God’s wonderfully imaginative solution to the problem of providing His
creatures with Free Will in an otherwise well-ordered Universe. Indeed, how
could we dream of free will in the purely deterministic Universe envisioned
by Laplace if everything ever to happen is predetermined by (and in principle
calculable from) the actual conditions or even those existing at the time of
the Big Bang?
In this essay, we share our view that Quantum Mechanics is in fact deter-
ministic, local and realistic, in complete contradiction with most people’s per-
ception of Bell’s theorem, thanks to our new theory of parallel lives. Accord-
ingly, what we perceive as the so-called “collapse of the wavefunction” is but
an illusion. Then we ask the fundamental question: Can a purely determinis-
tic Quantum Theory give rise to the illusion of nondeterminism, randomness,
probabilities, and ultimately can free will emerge from such a theory?
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1 Introduction
By the end of the 19th Century, most physicists had evolved a completely
deterministic view of the world. Even though he had many precursors, such as
Paul Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach (1770), with his very influential Syste`me
de la Nature, it was the great French mathematician and astronomer Pierre-
Simon, marquis de Laplace (1814), who expressed in the clearest terms the
philosophy according to which everything is predetermined by the initial
conditions. In his Essai philosophique sur les probabilite´s, he wrote:
We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state
and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant an intelligence
which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective
situation of the beings who compose it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these
data to analysis—it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest
bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain
and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes.
If Laplace were right, would there be any possibility for conscious beings
to exercise free will? Anything we might imagine that we are deciding would
in fact have been “written” from the initial conditions existing at the time of
the Big Bang! It would seem that free will requires some form of nondeter-
minism or randomness; that it cannot take hold unless some events happen
without a cause. 1 Even though chaos theory makes it impossible to predict
the future in a fully deterministic universe as soon as there is even the tiniest
imprecision on the initial conditions, these initial conditions would exist pre-
cisely according to classical physics, and thus the future would be determined,
independently of our possibility of predicting it.
In the 20th Century, quantum mechanics ushered in one of the greatest
revolutions in the history of science. In particular, it is generally considered
to be the ultimate theory capable of explaining the emergence of randomness
by virtue of a mysterious process known as the “collapse of the wavefunction”,
which seems to be inherent to irreversible quantum measurements. Therefore,
quantum mechanics can be thought of as God’s wonderfully imaginative solu-
tion to the problem of providing His creatures with free will in an otherwise
well-ordered Universe. Nevertheless, Einstein so disliked the idea of true ran-
domness in Nature that he claimed to be “convinced that He [God] does
not throw dice” in a 1926 letter to Born (Einstein, Born and Born, 1971).
Most physicists today would say that Einstein was wrong in rejecting the
occurrence of truly random events. But was he?
In this essay, we share our view that quantum mechanics is in fact deter-
ministic, local and realistic, in complete contradiction with most people’s per-
ception of Bell’s theorem, thanks to our new theory of parallel lives. Accord-
1 Nevertheless, we do acknowledge that compatibilists hold the belief that free will and
determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logi-
cally inconsistent. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/, accessed on
29 February 2012.
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ingly, what we perceive as the so-called “collapse of the wavefunction” is but
an illusion. Then we ask the fundamental question: Can a purely determinis-
tic quantum theory give rise to the illusion of nondeterminism, randomness,
probabilities, and ultimately can free will emerge from such a theory?
For the sake of liveliness, the nontechnical style of this essay is purposely
that of a spontaneous after-dinner speech. It is meant for the enjoyment of
a curiosity-driven and scientifically-minded readership who does not have
prior knowledge in quantum mechanics. Occasional remarks and more rigor-
ous details for the benefit of the expert are offered in the footnotes with no
apologies for the casual reader. The next three sections review the standard
notions of pure and mixed states, of entanglement, and of how one part of an
entangled state can be described. Readers familiar with these notions may
prefer to proceed directly with Sect. 5, which describes the Church of the
Larger Hilbert Space, a central notion to this essay since it restores deter-
minism into quantum mechanics. Section 6 attempts to go one step further
in restoring also locality at the expense of realism, but it fails to do so. Then,
Sect. 7 announces our new theory, which we call parallel lives, in which both
locality and realism are restored in a physical world in which Bell’s inequali-
ties are nevertheless violated. Finally, Sect. 8 discusses the implication of all
of the above on the existence or not of free will, be it real or illusory.
2 Pure and mixed states
According to quantum mechanics, one has to distinguish between pure and
mixed states. A pure state, generally denoted |Ψ〉 following Paul Dirac, is used
to represent a state about which everything is known. For instance, |0〉 and |1〉
correspond to the classical notion of bits 0 and 1, whereas |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉
denotes a qubit (for “quantum bit”), whose state is an equal superposition of
|0〉 and |1〉. This means that |Ψ〉 represents a state that corresponds simul-
taneously to classical bit values 0 and 1, each with amplitude 1√
2
. If this
qubit is measured in the so-called computational basis (|0〉 vs. |1〉), standard
quantum mechanics has it that it will collapse to either classical state |0〉
or |1〉, each with a probability given by the square of the norm of the corre-
sponding amplitude, here | 1√
2
|2 = 1/2 for each alternative. Even though the
specific result of the measurement is not determined by the pure state, and
two strictly identical particles in that same state could yield different results
following the same measurement, the probabilities associated with such mea-
surement outcomes are known exactly. Furthermore, this particular state
would behave in a totally deterministic manner if subjected to a different
measurement, known in this case as the Hadamard measurement (or mea-
surement in the Hadamard basis “H”), which asks it to “choose” between
H|0〉 = 1√
2
|0〉+ 1√
2
|1〉 and H|1〉 = 1√
2
|0〉 − 1√
2
|1〉. In this case, our state would
choose the former since in fact |Ψ〉 = H|0〉. Peres (1995) defined a pure state
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as one for which there exists a complete measurement (which he calls a “max-
imal test”) under which it behaves deterministically.
In contrast, mixed states are used when there is intrinsic uncertainty not
just about the result of some measurement but about the result of all possible
complete measurements, hence about the state itself. One way to picture a
mixed state is to think of a black box inhabited by a Daemon. When a user
pushes a button, the Daemon spits out a state that it chooses at random, 2
say with equal probability between |0〉 and |1〉. Such a mixed state would be
denoted
E1 = {(|0〉, 1/2), (|1〉, 1/2)}. (1)
More generally, a mixture of k different pure states is denoted
E = {(|Ψ1〉, p1), (|Ψ2〉, p2), . . . , (|Ψk〉, pk)} = {(|Ψi〉, pi)}ki=1 , (2)
which means that the Daemon chooses some |Ψi〉 with probability pi,
1 ≤ i ≤ k, where the probabilities sum up to 1. It is legitimate to wonder
if such a state is pure since the Daemon knows which |Ψi〉 it chose, or if
it is mixed since the user does not know. In a sense it is both. Neverthe-
less, no measurement chosen by the user will provide a deterministic answer.
For instance, a measurement of E1 in the computational basis will reveal the
Daemon’s random choice, which has equal probability 1/2 of being |0〉 or |1〉.
On the other hand, a measurement in the Hadamard basis will produce H|0〉
or H|1〉 with equal probability 1/2 since such would be the case regardless of
whether the Daemon had spit out |0〉 or |1〉. Thus we see that the random-
ness lies with the Daemon in one case and with the user’s measurement in
the other case, but the final result is the same. More interestingly, it can
be demonstrated that any measurement on E1 that would ask it to choose
between two arbitrary one-qubit orthogonal states would choose either one
with equal probability. (Two states are orthogonal if it is possible in principle
to distinguish perfectly between them, such as |0〉 and |1〉, or H|0〉 and H|1〉.)
By Peres’ definition, E1 is not pure since there does not exist a complete
measurement under which it behaves deterministically.
Mixed states can be described as above by a mixture of pure states, but
they can also be described in two other ways. One of them is known as the
density matrix (aka density operator). This is a matrix (an array of num-
bers) that can be calculated mathematically from the more intuitive mixture
{(|Ψi〉, pi)}ki=1 of pure states. The remarkable fact about density matrices
is that different mixtures can give rise to the same matrix, yet this matrix
represents all that is measurable about the state, by any measurement what-
soever “allowed” by quantum mechanics. For instance, the density matrix
that is computed from Eq. (1) is identical to that arising from the apparently
different mixture
2 This must be a true random choice, possibly implemented by a quantum-mechanical
process; flipping a classical coin would not suffice here.
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E2 = {(H|0〉, 1/2), (H|1〉, 1/2)}. (3)
In other words, if we trust a Daemon to send us an equal mixture of |0〉
and |1〉 (Eq. 1) but in fact it provides us with an equal mixture of H|0〉
and H|1〉 (Eq. 3), we shall never be able to notice that it is “cheating”! 3
Given that these two mixtures are impossible to distinguish, it makes sense
to consider the corresponding mixed states as actually identical. Just for
completeness, notice that even mixtures featuring more than 2 pure states
can be indistinguishable from those above. For instance, mixture
E3 = {(|0〉, 1/3), (12 |0〉+
√
3
2
|1〉, 1/3), (12 |0〉 −
√
3
2
|1〉, 1/3)} (4)
is indistinguishable from (hence identical to) mixtures E1 and E2 because it
gives rise to the same density matrix.
We postpone until Sect. 5 discussion of the third way—by far the most
interesting—in which one may think of mixed states.
3 Entanglement
The concept of entanglement was first published (although not named) by
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935), in a failed attempt to demonstrate
the incompleteness of the quantum formalism. However, there is historical
evidence that the notion had been anticipated by Schro¨dinger several years
previously, who was quick to understand the importance of entanglement:
“I would not call that one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum
mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure from classical lines of
thought” (Schro¨dinger, 1935). We could not agree more with this assessment.
Our quantum world is not classical because, as spectacularly demonstrated
by Bell (1964), entanglement cannot be explained by any classical local real-
istic theory of the sort that was so dear to Einstein. (Or can it? We’ll come
back to this question in Sect. 7.) Indeed, we consider entanglement to be
the key to understanding Nature. We would even go so far as to say that
it’s our best window into probing the soul of the Universe. The other non-
classical aspects of quantum mechanics, such as the quantization of energy
and its consequence on the photoelectric effect—which earned Einstein his
Nobel Prize in 1921—are no doubt important, but lag far behind the magic
of entanglement on our personal wonder scale.
Entanglement is a phenomenon by which two (or more) physically sepa-
rated systems must sometimes be thought of as a single (nonlocal) entity.
3 A much more remarkable example of cheating is possible for a Daemon who would be
“paid” to produce randomly chosen Bell states. It could produce instead pairs of purely
classical uncorrelated random bits. These mixtures being identical in terms of density
matrices, such cheating would be strictly undetectable by the user. This is profitable for
the Daemon because classical bits are so much easier to produce than Bell states!
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The simplest example of entanglement is known as the singlet state,
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
|01〉 − 1√
2
|10〉 , (5)
which consists of two particles. A measurement of both particles in the com-
putational basis results in either outcome |01〉 or |10〉, each with equal prob-
ability since | ± 1√
2
|2 = 1/2. Here, outcome |01〉 means that the first particle
is measured as |0〉 and the second as |1〉, and similarly for outcome |10〉.
In other words, the two particles yield opposite answers when they are mea-
sured in the computational basis. So far, this is not more mysterious than if
someone had flipped a penny, sliced it through its edge, put each half-penny
in an envelope, and mailed the envelopes to two distant locations. When the
envelopes are opened (“measured”), there is no surprise in the fact that each
one reveals a seemingly random result (heads or tails) but that the two results
are complementary. Such an explanation would correspond to purely classical
mixed state
E0 = {(|01〉, 1/2), (|10〉, 1/2)}, (6)
where |0〉 stands for heads and |1〉 stands for tails.
What makes this singlet state so marvellous is that quantum mechanics
asserts that |Ψ−〉 is indeed the pure state given in Eq. (5) and not the mixed
state of Eq. (6), and that those are very different indeed. In particular, the
result of any measurement is not predetermined (as it would be with the half-
penny analogy): it comes into existence only as a result of the measurement
itself. This is particularly mysterious when the two particles are arbitrarily far
apart because it is as if they were magic coins which, when flipped, always
provide opposite, yet freshly random, outcomes. In fact, the two particles
provide opposite answers to any complete measurement, provided they are
subjected to the same one. It’s like an old couple who disagrees on any ques-
tion you may ask them. . . even when they don’t have a clue about the answer
and hence respond randomly! This phenomenon can be “explained” by ele-
mentary linear algebra, according to which state |Ψ−〉, as given in Eq. (5), is
mathematically equivalent to
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
|ψ〉|φ〉 − 1√
2
|φ〉|ψ〉 (7)
for any two one-qubit orthogonal states |ψ〉 and |φ〉, such as H|0〉 and H|1〉.
It is important to understand that this behaviour would not occur with the
mixed state of Eq. (6) because, in that case, asking the two particles to
“choose” between H|0〉 and H|1〉 would produce two random and uncorrelated
outcomes.
An entangled state such as the singlet behaves exactly as if the first par-
ticle, when asked by a measurement to choose between orthogonal states |ψ〉
and |φ〉, flipped a fair coin to decide which one to select, and then “instructed”
the other particle to instantaneously assume the opposite state. This gives the
impression of instantaneous action at a distance, a concept that so revolted
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Einstein that he derisively called it spukhafte Fernwirkungen (“Spooky action
at a distance”). But is this really what happens or is it only a na¨ıve “explana-
tion”? We shall come back to this most fundamental issue in Sects. 6 and 7.
It has been experimentally demonstrated that if indeed the particles had
to communicate, then the effect of the first measurement on the second
particle would have to take place at least ten thousand times faster than
at the speed of light (Salart, Baas, Branciard, Gisin and Zbinden, 2008).
Even more amazingly, relativistic experiments have been performed, fol-
lowing a fascinating theoretical proposal by Suarez and Scarani (1997),
in which the predictions of quantum mechanics continue to hold even
when the two particles move apart quickly enough that they are both
measured before the other in their respective inertial reference frames
(Stefanov, Zbinden, Gisin and Suarez, 2002). These remarkable experiments
make it untenable to claim that the first measured particle somehow sends
a signal to tell the other how to behave. This has prompted Gisin (2012) to
assert that quantum correlation “emerge from outside space-time”.
We highly recommend the exceptionally lucid and entertaining popular
accounts of some classically-impossible marvels made possible by entangle-
ment that have been written by Mermin (1981, 1994) for the American Jour-
nal of Physics.
4 Describing one part of an entangled state
The defining characteristic of a pure entangled state split between two distant
locations is that neither of the local subsystems can be described as a pure
state of its own. This should be clear from Peres’ definition of a pure state
and the fact that each part of an entangled state is so that its outcome is not
predetermined, no matter to which complete measurement it is subjected.
Nevertheless, it makes sense to wonder if there is a way to describe the state
of one of the subsystems.
One natural approach is to see what would happen if we measured the other
subsystem. Consider for instance the singlet state |Ψ−〉 and let us measure one
of the particles in the computational basis. We have seen that the outcome
is |0〉 (resp. |1〉) with probability 1/2, in which case the other system is now
in state |1〉 (resp. |0〉). Therefore, if one system is measured and one forgets
the outcome of the measurement, the unmeasured system is in state |0〉 with
probability 1/2 and in state |1〉 also with probability 1/2. In other words, this
system is in mixed state E1, according to Eq. (1). But the first system could
have been measured in the Hadamard basis instead. Depending on the result
of this measurement, the unmeasured system would then be left either in
state H|0〉 or H|1〉, each with probability 1/2. If we forget again the result
of the measurement, the unmeasured system is therefore in mixed state E2,
according to Eq. (3). Now, remember that mixtures E1 and E2 are considered
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to be identical since they give rise to the same density matrix. More generally,
it can be demonstrated from the formalism of quantum mechanics that no
matter which complete measurement is performed on one subsystem of an
arbitrary entangled state, the other subsystem always ends up in the same
mixed state in terms of a density matrix, albeit not necessarily according to
the same mixture of pure states.
It follows that nothing can be more natural than to describe one subsystem
of an entangled state by the mixed state in which this subsystem would be left
if the other subsystem were measured. This is well-defined since the resulting
density matrix does not depend on how the other subsystem is measured. If we
carry this reasoning to its inescapable conclusion, it makes sense to describe
the state of a subsystem in this way even if the other subsystem has not been
measured yet, indeed even if it is never to be measured. When we consider
the state of a subsystem of an entangled state in this way, we say that we
trace out the other subsystem.
Section 3 may have left you with the impression that entanglement requires
instantaneous communication, which would be incompatible with Einstein’s
special theory of relativity. If we remember that the density matrix describes
all that can be measured about a quantum system, however, it follows from
the above discussion that entanglement cannot be used to signal information
between two points in space since no operation performed on one subsystem
of an entangled state can have a measurable effect on the other subsystem.
It is as if quantum systems were capable of instantaneous communication,
but only in tantalizing ways that could not be harnessed by us, macroscopic
humans, to establish such communication between ourselves. We shall come
back on the consequences of this crucial issue in Sects. 6 and 7.
5 Church of the Larger Hilbert Space
We have just seen that the state of any subsystem of a pure (or, for that
matter, mixed as well) entangled state can be expressed as a mixed state in a
unique and natural way. It is remarkable that the converse holds. We saw in
Sect. 2 that mixed states can be described either as mixtures of pure states
(possibly under the control of a Daemon) or as density matrices, but we
promised a third way and here it is. Any mixed state can be described as
the trace-out of some subsystem from an appropriate pure state. Such a pure
state is called a purification of the mixed state under consideration.
There is an easy way (theoretically speaking) to construct a purification
of an arbitrary mixture E = {(|Ψi〉, pi)}ki=1. For this, consider some other
quantum system that could be in any of k orthogonal states |Φ1〉, |Φ2〉, . . . ,
|Φk〉 and consider pure state
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|Ψ〉 =
k∑
i=1
√
pi |Ψi〉|Φi〉 ,
where “
∑k
i=1
” serves to denote a quantum superposition on k pure states.
If the right-hand subsystem of |Ψ〉 were measured by asking it to “choose”
between one of the |Φi〉’s, each |Φi〉 would be chosen with probability
|√pi|2 = pi, leaving the unmeasured left-hand subsystem in state |Ψi〉.
Now, imagine that it were our friend the Daemon who prepared pure
state |Ψ〉 and measured its right-hand subsystem. By learning which |Φi〉 is
obtained, with probability pi, the Daemon would know in which pure state
|Ψi〉 the unmeasured subsystem is. If the Daemon spits out this subsystem to
the user, without revealing the result of the measurement, the user receives
a mixed state corresponding to mixture E . As in Sect. 2, this system is in a
pure state for the Daemon and in a mixed state for the user. The beauty of
this concept is that it works even if the Daemon has not, in fact, measured
the right-hand subsystem of the pure state it had created. Even better, it still
works if the Daemon has destroyed that right-hand subsystem, inasmuch as
a quantum state can be destroyed, to prevent any temptation to measure it
later and sell the answer to the user! In this case, the surviving quantum
system would be in mixed state E not only for the user, but also for the
Daemon.
The fact that any mixed state can be considered as the trace-out of one of
its purifications is the fundamental tenet of the Church of the Larger Hilbert
Space, a term coined by John Smolin because the formalism of quantum
mechanics has pure quantum states inhabit so-called Hilbert spaces and any
mixed state can be thought of as a subsystem from a pure state than lives in
a larger Hilbert space.
Everything that we have explained so far in this essay corresponds to
strictly orthodox quantum mechanics and no (serious) physicist would dis-
agree with a single word from it. From this point on, however, we articulate
our personal beliefs concerning the world in which we live, which are admit-
tedly very similar to the “relative state” formulation of quantum mechanics
put forward by Everett (1957) more than fifty years ago; see also Byrne
(2007).
The weak Faithfuls in the Church of the Larger Hilbert Space believe in the
fact that any mixed state can be thought of as the trace-out of some imaginary
purification, but this is only for mathematical convenience. In fact, it is not
possible to believe in the predictions and formalism of quantum mechanics
without being (at least) a weak faithful since the (mathematical) existence
of a purification for any mixed state is a theorem that can be derived from
first principles.
The strong Faithfuls—among whom we stand—believe that to any mixed
state that actually exists, there corresponds somewhere in the Universe an
appropriate purification. This is an extremely far-reaching belief since it
implies (among other things) that the “collapse of the wavefunction”, which
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orthodox quantum mechanics associates with measurements, is but an illu-
sion. In fact, strong belief in the Church implies that quantum mechanics
is strictly unitary and therefore reversible. If we forget for simplicity the
necessity to apply relativistic corrections, the Universe is ruled by one law
only, known as Schro¨dinger’s equation. This equation is deterministic—even
linear—and therefore so is the entire evolution of the Universe.
Let us consider for instance the simplest case of orthodox collapse of
the wavefunction: the measurement of a single diagonally-polarized photon
(a particle of light) by an apparatus that distinguishes between horizontal and
vertical polarizations. For definiteness, consider a calcite crystal that splits
an incoming light beam between horizontally and vertically polarized sub-
beams followed by two single-photon detectors (which we assume perfect for
sake of the argument). Any horizontally-polarized photon would cause one
of the two detectors to react, whereas a vertically-polarized photon would
cause the other detector to react. According to orthodox quantum mechan-
ics, a diagonally-polarized photon would hit the crystal and then continue
in quantum superposition of both paths until it hits both detectors. At this
point, one (and only one) of the detectors would “see” the photon and pro-
duce a macroscopic effect that would be detectable by the (human) observer.
For some, the phenomenon would become irreversible as soon as it has had
a macroscopic effect inside the detector; for others only when some observer
becomes conscious of the outcome.
According to the Strong Church of the Larger Hilbert Space, neither is
the case: the diagonally-polarized photon is in fact in an equal superposi-
tion of being horizontally and vertically polarized (so far, this is in strict
accordance with orthodox quantum mechanics) and the crystal merely puts
the photon in a superposition of both the horizontally and vertically polar-
ized paths (still in accordance with orthodox quantum mechanics). But
when the photon hits both detectors, it becomes entangled with them. The
composite system photon-detectors is now in an equal superposition of the
photon being horizontally-polarized and the horizontal-polarization detector
having reacted with the photon being vertically-polarized and the vertical-
polarization detector having reacted. And when the observer looks at the
detectors, he or she becomes entangled with the photon-detector system so
that now the photon-detecter-observer system is in an equal superposition
of the photon being horizontally-polarized, the horizontal-polarization detec-
tor having reacted and the observer having seen the horizontal-polarization
detector reacting with the same events corresponding to a vertically-polarized
photon.
From this perspective, there is no collapse. The horizontal detection is as
real as the vertical one. But any (human) observer becomes aware of only
one outcome, and here lies the apparent paradox. If indeed both events occur
(in quantum superposition), how come our experience makes us (humans)
believe that only one outcome (apparently chosen at random by Nature) has
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actually occurred? In his groundbreaking paper, Everett (1957) proposed the
following analogy:
Arguments that the world picture presented by this theory is contradicted by experience,
because we are unaware of any branching process, are like the criticism of the Copernican
theory that the mobility of the earth as a real physical fact is incompatible with the
common sense interpretation of nature because we feel no such motion. In both cases
the argument fails when it is shown that the theory itself predicts that our experience
will be what it in fact is. (In the Copernican case the addition of Newtonian physics
was required to be able to show that the earth’s inhabitants would be unaware of any
motion of the earth.)
In other words, it is not because we (humans) cannot feel the Earth moving
under our feet that it stands still at the centre of the Universe! Similarly, it is
not because we cannot feel the Universal superposition that it does not exist.
According to the Strong Church of the Larger Hilbert Space, the Earth as
we feel it has but a tiny amplitude in the Universal wavefunction, and each
one of us has an even tinier amplitude. This perspective is very humbling
indeed, much more so than accepting the insignificance of the Earth within
the classical Universe, but this is nevertheless the perspective in which we
most passionately believe.
It remains to see how the Church of the Larger Hilbert Space can account
for the phenomenon described in Sect. 3 when we discussed the measurement
of far-apart entangled particles 4. Consider again two particles in the singlet
state (Eq. 5) and assume that they are both subjected to the same measure-
ment, which asks them to “choose” between orthogonal states |ψ〉 and |φ〉.
We can think of the two particles as being in the state given by Eq. (7), which
once again is mathematically equivalent to Eq. (5), and initially the measure-
ment apparatuses have not reacted, so that they are not entangled with the
particles. The joint state of the apparatus-particle-particle-apparatus system
can therefore be described as
|?〉
(
1√
2
|ψ〉|φ〉 − 1√
2
|φ〉|ψ〉
)
|?〉 , (8)
where |?〉 represents a measurement apparatus that has not yet reacted. This
is mathematically equivalent to
1√
2
|?〉|ψ〉|φ〉|?〉 − 1√
2
|?〉|φ〉|ψ〉|?〉 . (9)
Let us say without loss of generality that the particle on the left is mea-
sured first. According to the Church of the Larger Hilbert Space, this has
the effect of entangling it with its measurement apparatus. However (and
4 Of course, we must account for all the nonclassical correlations that violate various forms
of Bell inequalities, not only for the (classically explicable) fact that two particles in the
singlet state will always give opposite answers when subjected to the same measurement.
This paragraph can be adapted mutatis mutandis to any pair of measurements, includ-
ing POVMs, on an arbitrary bipartite entangled state, as well as to similar scenarios for
multipartite entanglement.
12 G. Brassard and P. Raymond-Robichaud
contrary to the teachings of standard quantum mechanics), the two particles
remain entangled, albeit no longer in the singlet state. Now, the joint state
of the complete system has (unitarily) evolved to
(
1√
2
|Ψ〉|ψ〉|φ〉 − 1√
2
|Φ〉|φ〉|ψ〉
)
|?〉 , (10)
where |Ψ〉 (resp. |Φ〉) represents the state of a measurement apparatus that
has registered a particle in state |ψ〉 (resp. |φ〉). Note that the apparatus
on the right is still unentangled with the other systems under consideration.
Finally, when the particle on the right is measured, the system evolves to
1√
2
|Ψ〉|ψ〉|φ〉|Φ〉 − 1√
2
|Φ〉|φ〉|ψ〉|Ψ〉 . (11)
At this point, if we trace out the two particles, the detectors are left in mixed
state
{(|Ψ〉|Φ〉, 1/2), (|Φ〉|Ψ〉, 1/2)}, (12)
which is exactly as it should: they have produced random but complemen-
tary outcomes. Naturally, we could also involve two human observers in this
scenario. If we had, they would enter the macroscopic entangled state of
Eq. (11); at that point, they would in a superposition of having seen the
two possible complementary sets of outcomes, but they would be blissfully
unaware of this.
As an amusing anecdote, we cannot resist mentioning the (real-life!) ven-
ture called cheap universes. 5 For a mere $3.95, or unlimited use for $1.99 on
an iPhone, you can select two courses of action (such as “I shall either go
on a hike, or I shall take a nice hot bath”) and ask cheap universes to make
a purely quantum choice between the two alternatives. 6 Provided you have
self-pledged to obey the outcome, you may proceed lightheartedly because
you know that you are also performing the other action in the Universal
wavefunction. Indeed, should the consequences of having indulged in a nice
hot bath turn out to be disastrous, you can take comfort in knowing that you
have also gone on a hike and hope that this was indeed the path to happiness.
Sounds crazy? Not to us!
The Strong Church of the Larger Hilbert Space is different from (but not
incompatible with) the so-called Many-World Interpretation of Quantum
Mechanics (usually associated with the name of Everett) in the sense that
we believe in a single Universe—not in the “Multiverse” advocated by the
Many-World Interpretation followers—but one in which quantum mechanics
5 http://www.cheapuniverses.com, accessed on 29 February 2012.
6 Specifically, cheap universes uses a commercial device called QUANTIS, available from
ID Quantique, in which “photons are sent one by one onto a semi-transparent mirror and
detected; the exclusive events (reflection/transmission) are associated to ‘0’/‘1’ bit values”.
See http://www.idquantique.com/true-random-number-generator/products-overview.html,
accessed on 29 February 20102. According to our example, we would associate outcome 0
with “I shall go on a hike” and outcome 1 with “I shall take a nice hot bath”.
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rules at face value: We (poor humans) perceive only what we call the classi-
cal states, but arbitrarily complex superpositions of them do in fact exist in
reality.
6 Can locality be restored outside of the Church?
Einstein thought that quantum mechanics must be incomplete because it did
not fulfil his wish for a local and realistic theory. We distinguish between
strong realism, according to which any property of a physical system regis-
tered by a measurement apparatus (or by any other process by which the
system is observed) existed prior to the measurement, so that the apparatus
merely reveals what was already there, and weak realism, according to which
a physical system can respond probabilistically to a measurement appara-
tus, but the probability distribution of the possible outcomes exists prior to
the measurement. For instance, the diagonal polarization of a horizontally-
polarized photon exhibits weak realism according to quantum mechanics
because its measurement behaves randomly, yet with well-defined probabil-
ities (in this case with equal probability of registering a +45◦ or a −45◦
outcome).
Similarly, we distinguish between strong locality, according to which no
action performed at point A can have an effect on point B faster than the time
it takes light to go from A to B, and weak locality, according to which there
can be no observable such effect. As we have seen already, if two particles are
jointly in the singlet state (Eq. 5) and if one is measured, yielding outcome
|0〉, the other particle behaves as if its state had instantaneously changed
from being half a singlet to pure state |1〉, no matter how far apart the
two particles are. Even though this phenomenon seems to violate strong
locality (we shall come back on this issue below and in the next section), it
is important to understand that it does not violate weak locality because the
instantaneous effect (if it exists) cannot be detected by any process allowed
by quantum mechanics. Taking account of the special theory of relativity,
violations of weak locality would enable reversals in causality (effects could
precede causes), whereas violations of strong locality have no such spectacular
consequences. Fortunately, quantum mechanics does not allow any violation
of weak locality. From now on, “locality” will be understood to mean “strong
locality” unless specified otherwise
For a strong faithful in the Church of the Larger Hilbert Space, the issue
of locality can take different flavours. At one extreme, the wavefunction is
the one and only reality and the question does not even make sense. The
universe is in a massive superposition and anything that appears to involve a
random quantum choice in one branch of the superposition “simply” makes
the universal superposition more complicated; the issue of locality does not
even spring up. This position is often considered to be a “cop out” by those
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who are not faithfuls of the Church, who think that believers are simply
avoiding the issue rather than trying to explain it. The other extreme among
the faithfuls is populated by the advocates of the many-world interpretation
of quantum mechanics, some of whom consider that the entire world splits
up each time a random quantum choice appears to be made. Such a split is
highly nonlocal if it is instantaneous. In the next section, we shall present
our parallel lives interpretation of the Church of the Larger Hilbert Space,
which is fully compatible with locality. In the rest of this section, however,
we shall step outside of the Church and attempt to reconcile locality with
quantum mechanics while denying the possibility for macroscopic objects
(such as human observers) to enter into a superposition.
The great discovery of Bell (1964), or so it seems, is that the predictions
of quantum mechanics are incompatible with any possible strongly local and
weakly realistic theory of the world. 7 Since quantum mechanics has been vin-
dicated by increasingly sophisticated experiments (Freedman and Clauser,
1972; Aspect, Grangier and Roger, 1981; Aspect, Dalibart and Roger, 1982;
Aspect, Grangier and Roger, 1982; Stefanov, Zbinden, Gisin and Suarez,
2002; Salart, Baas, Branciard, Gisin and Zbinden, 2008, etc.), most physi-
cists infer that there is no other choice but to forego locality. However, we
beg to disagree on the inevitability of this conclusion. If the world cannot be
simultaneously local and realistic, could locality be restored at the expense
of realism?
One may attempt to achieve this by accepting that the state of a quantum
system is fundamentally subjective (or to be technically more exact, epis-
temic). For instance, the same particle can be in one state for one observer
and in a different state for another. And both observers can be perfectly correct
about the state of the particle! However, they must have compatible beliefs
in the sense that there must exist at least one pure state that is excluded by
neither observer. 8
For sake of the argument, consider again a quantum system in the singlet
state (Eq. 5) so that the two particles are arbitrarily far apart, say at points A
and B, which are inhabited by Alice and Bob, respectively. We have seen that
the state of either particle can be described locally by mixture E1 from Eq. (1).
To stress that we are not talking about the specific mixture of pure states
explicit in E1 (since the state of these particles can just as well be described
by mixtures E2 or E3), let us denote the corresponding density matrix by ρ,
which is uniquely defined.
Consider what happens if Alice measures her particle in the computational
basis and obtains (say) outcome |0〉. Then, assuming Bob has not interacted
with his particle, Alice knows that Bob’s particle is no longer in mixed state ρ:
7 To be historically more accurate, Bell’s original 1964 paper was concerned with strong
realism only, but it can be strengthened to take account of weak realism.
8 To be technically exact and much more general, there must exist at least one ontic state
compatible with both epistemic beliefs, unless we are ready to accept that there is no
underlying reality at all (Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2011).
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now it is in state |1〉. But for Bob, nothing has changed! His particle was in
state ρ before Alice’s measurement and it still is in this same state immedi-
ately after the far-away measurement. In other words, the particle at point B
is in state |1〉 for Alice and in state ρ for Bob, and both observers are correct
in their assertions concerning the same particle. This is reminiscent of the
proverbial Indian story of the blind men and an elephant. 9
The effect of Alice’s measurement can propagate to Bob, but only if a
classical message transits between them. However, such a message cannot
travel faster than at the speed of light. It follows that there is no faster-than-
light change in the state of the particle at point B, as seen by Bob from that
point. More generally, no operation performed at any point in space can have
an instantaneous observable effect on any other point. Seen this way, no cause
can have an effect faster than at the speed of light, causality is not violated,
and Einstein can rest in peace.
Naturally, it is possible for an observer to be wrong about the state of a
particle. For instance, if Alice prepares a particle in state |0〉 and sends it
to Bob, who is far away, and if Bob subjects it to a Hadamard transforma-
tion without telling Alice, then Alice may think that the particle is still in
state |0〉 and be wrong since it is now in state H|0〉. However, this is not in
contradiction with the above: It is not because the same particle can be in
two different states according to two different observers and that both can
be correct that anybody who has some opinion about the state of a quantum
system is necessarily right! For Alice to know the state of a far-away particle,
even subjectively, she must know what has happened to it after it left her
hands. We shall therefore consider for simplicity a bipartite scenario in which
each party knows what the other party is doing.
Can we completely restore locality at the expense of realism with this
line of approach? Unfortunately, there is a serious problem. Consider again
the case of Alice and Bob sharing a singlet state and of Alice measuring
her particle. We argued above that Alice and Bob can both be correct if
Alice thinks of Bob’s particle as being in state |1〉 whereas Bob thinks of it
as being in mixed state ρ. But now, if Bob decides to measure his particle,
and if indeed his belief that it is in state ρ were correct, there would be no
local reason that would prevent him from registering outcome |0〉, which is
indeed possible when measuring ρ since it can be thought of as mixed state E1
from Eq. 1. This would no longer be compatible with Alice’s belief that Bob’s
particle is in state |1〉, even though each party knows what the other is doing.
Furthermore, if they meet in the future and compare notes, Alice and Bob
will register correlations that are not in accordance with quantum mechanics.
(Please remember that this section is written under the assumption that
neither Alice nor Bob can be in a superposition of having seen both results.)
Does it follow that quantum mechanics cannot be explained by a local
theory even if we are willing to forego realism? It turns out that we can
9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_men_and_an_elephant , accessed on 29 Febru-
ary 2012.
16 G. Brassard and P. Raymond-Robichaud
have our cake and eat it too, provided we reintegrate the Church of the
Larger Hilbert Space. Contrary to the prevalent belief, the laws of nature
can be simultaneously local and realistic, and yet obey all the predictions of
quantum mechanics. In order to reconcile this claim with Bell’s impossibility
proof, please consider the quotation of Bell’s at the opening of this essay and
read on.
7 Parallel Lives
We shall fully develop our parallel lives theory for quantum mechanics in
a subsequent paper. Here, for simplicity, we explain how local realism can
be consistent with bipartite correlations that are usually considered to be
even more nonlocal than those allowed by quantum mechanics. Specifically,
we consider the so-called nonlocal box introduced by Popescu and Rohrlich
(1994), which we illustrate with a tale that takes place in an imaginary world,
i.e. in a toy model of an alternative universe. Our universe follows Einstein’s
special theory of relativity so that it is possible to assert, according to the
principle of weak locality, that some events cannot influence the outcome of
other far-away events that are sufficiently simultaneous.
Imagine two inhabitants of this universe, Alice and Bob, who travel very
far apart in their spaceships. Each one of them is carrying a box that features
two buttons, labelled 0 and 1, and two lights, one green and one red. Once
they are sufficiently distant, Alice and Bob independently flip fair coins to
decide which button to push on their boxes, which causes one light to flash
on each box. The experiment is performed with sufficient simultaneity that
Alice’s box cannot know the result of Bob’s coin flip (hence the input to
Bob’s box) before it has to flash its own light, even if a signal travelling at
the speed of light left Bob’s spaceship at the flip of his coin toss to inform
Alice’s box of the outcome, and vice versa. 10
After several instances of this experiment, Alice and Bob meet again to
compare their results. They discover to their amazement that they saw dif-
ferent colours when and only when they had both pushed the “1” button.
In a local classical world that denies the Church of the Larger Hilbert Space,
in which Alice and Bob cannot enter into a superposition (as in the previous
section), it is easy to see that such boxes cannot exist. More precisely, the
best box that can be built cannot produce such results with a probability
better 75%. In a quantum-mechanical world, we can do better by the magic
10 We are implicitly ruling out the local realistic theory of superdeterminism here, accord-
ing to which there is no way to prevent the boxes from knowing which button is pressed on
the other box, not because a signal travels quickly enough between the boxes, but because
everything being deterministic, each box knows everything about the future, including
which buttons will be pushed anywhere in the universe.
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism, accessed on 29 February 2012.
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of entanglement, but the success probability cannot exceed cos2 pi/8 ≈ 85%
(Cirel’son, 1980), hence our imaginary world is not ruled by quantum mechan-
ics either. This is fine: remember that the purpose of this scenario is not to
suggest a model of our world, but rather to show that it is possible in a local
realistic world to violate a Bell inequality.
What is the trick? Imagine that each spaceship lives inside a bubble. When
Alice pushes one button on her box, her bubble splits into two parallel bub-
bles. Each bubble contains a copy of the spaceship and its inhabitant. Inside
one bubble, Alice has seen the red light flash on her box; inside the other
bubble, she has seen the green light flash. From now on, the two bubbles are
living parallel lives. They cannot interact between themselves in any way and
will never meet again. The same phenomenon takes place when Bob pushes
one button on his box. Please note that Alice’s action has strictly no instan-
taneous influence on Bob’s bubble (or bubbles if he has already manipulated
his box): this splitting into parallel lives is a strictly local phenomenon.
Let us consider what happens if Alice and Bob, each of whom now lives
inside two parallel bubbles although they cannot feel it in any way 11 decide to
travel towards each other and meet again. (A similar scenario can be involved
if they decide to use classical communication in order to compare notes,
rather than travelling.) This is where magic 12 takes place: Each of the two
bubbles that contains Alice is allowed to interact and see only a single bubble
that contains Bob, namely the bubble that satisfies the conditions described
above. Note that such a perfect matching is always possible. Furthermore,
each bubble can “know” with which other bubble to interact provided it keeps
a (local) memory of which button was pressed and which light flashed. In this
way, each copy of Alice and Bob will be under the illusion of correlations that
“emerge from outside space-time” (Gisin, 2012). Yet these correlations take
place fully within space and time, in a completely local realistic universe.
Let us stress again that we are not claiming that our universe actu-
ally works as described above, because it does not, according to Cirel’son
(1980). Our point is that it is generally recognized that nonlocal boxes of
the sort we have described cannot exist in any local realistic world, and this
is false according to our toy model. To be more dramatic, consider Bell’s
theorem, or more precisely its best-known incarnation, the CHSH inequality
due to Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt (1969). This inequality states that
“in any classical theory [. . . ] a particular combination of correlations 13 lies
between −2 and 2” (Popescu and Rohrlich, 1994). The original purpose of
this inequality is that it is violated by quantum mechanics since the same
“particular combination of correlations” is predicted to be equal to 2
√
2,
11 Remember Everett’s analogy with medieval criticism of the Copernican theory concern-
ing the fact that we cannot feel the Earth move under our feet.
12 Remember Arthur C. Clarke’s Third Law: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is
indistinguishable from magic”!
13 Specifically, E(A,B) + E(A,B′) + E(A′, B) − E(A′, B′); for detail, please see Eqs. (1)
and (2) from Popescu and Rohrlich (1994).
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hence quantum mechanics cannot be explained by a “classical theory” of the
sort considered by Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt to derive their inequal-
ity. As demonstrated by Popescu and Rohrlich (1994), this combination can
as large as 4 without violating weak locality, and indeed it is equal to 4 in
our toy model of the world.
Have we uncovered a fundamental mistake in the paper of
Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt? Not at all! Bell’s inequalities (in-
cluding CHSH and those from Bell’s original 1964 paper) are proved, indeed
correctly, under the assumption that the classical world is a theory of local
hidden variables. The confusion comes from the fact that this has been
widely misinterpreted to mean that quantum mechanics rules out any local
realistic explanation of the world. For instance, Nielsen and Chuang (2000)
wrote in their book: “These two assumptions together are known as the
assumptions of local realism. [. . . ] The Bell inequalities show that at least
one of these assumptions is not correct. [. . . ] Bell’s inequalities together with
substantial experimental evidence now points to the conclusion that either
or both of locality and realism must be dropped from our view of the world.”
Note that Nielsen and Chuang consider here both locality and realism to be
of the strong type, but our parallel lives mechanism is purely deterministic,
hence it is strongly realistic as well.
The virtue of our toy model is to demonstrate in an exceedingly simple
way that local realistic worlds can produce correlations that are demonstrably
impossible in any classical theory based on local hidden variables. Therefore,
it illustrates the importance of understanding the true meaning of Bell’s
theorem. Nevertheless, it begs the question: what about quantum mechanics?
Can it be explained in a local realistic parallel lives scenario?
It turns out that the idea of quantum mechanics being local and realistic
in a theory analogous to parallel lives was discovered in the twentieth cen-
tury: it can be traced back at least to Deutsch and Hayden (1999). Similar
ideas were introduced subsequently by Rubin (2001) and Blaylock (2010).
The article of Deutsch and Hayden focused on locality without precisely for-
mulating definitions of realism or what we have called parallel lives, but their
mathematical structure was quite similar to what we propose here. Of course,
a complete reformulation of quantum mechanics along these lines is signifi-
cantly more technical and complicated than what is needed to “explain” non-
local boxes, but the conclusion is that the Church of the Larger Hilbert Space
can be interpreted to provide a fully deterministic, strongly local and strongly
realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, Bell’s theorem notwithstand-
ing. Indeed, this interpretation is not about parallel branches or parallel uni-
verses in a multiverse, but rather about parallel lives, which is a purely local
phenomenon.
We are currently working on a followup article that will provide much
more detail about our parallel lives theory.
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8 Free Will?
At this point, the fundamental question is “Can a purely deterministic quan-
tum theory give rise to at least the illusion of nondeterminism, randomness,
probabilities, and ultimately can free will emerge from such a theory”? Please
note that this section is written at the first person as it reflects solely the
opinion of the first author. The second author resolutely does not believe in
free will and therefore his position is that neither determinism nor random-
ness would be able to enable it.
I cannot answer in a definitive way the question asked at the beginning of
this section. Certainly, I acknowledge the difficulty of deriving the emergence
of probabilities as mathematically inevitable from a quantum Universe in
which all events occur unitarily according to the Church of the Larger Hilbert
Space (Kent, 2010). However, we are faced with exactly the same difficulty
if the collapse of the wave function does occur, or even in a purely classi-
cal world (Duhamel and Raymond-Robichaud, 2011). I also acknowledge the
difficulty of deriving free will from probabilities, randomness and nondeter-
minism. Nevertheless, I am inhabited by an unshakable belief that free will,
if it exists, cannot have another origin, with apologies to the compatibilists.
In his own essay for our meeting, Gisin (2012) expresses his view that the
Many-World Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics “leaves no space for free
will”. I suspect that he would have the same opinion concerning the Strong
Church of the Larger Hilbert Space. [He also maintains that free will is not
incompatible with the deterministic physics of Newton, but I fail to under-
stand how classical physics could escape the “intelligence” of Laplace (1814),
for which “nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be
present to its eyes”.] In any case, I admit that Gisin may be right, but my most
fundamental disagreement lies deeper than physics or mathematics when he
says: “I enjoy free will much more than I know anything about physics”.
I respect his opinion but my personal position is that I would prefer to live
in a world without free will rather than in one in which the wavefunction
collapses nonunitarily. After all, lack of free will in a deterministic universe
does not deprive us from our capacity to experience surprise and find wonder
in the world, because we cannot calculate, and hence predict, the future. But
of course, whether or not free will exists, it does not extend to the point of
letting each one of us choose in which of these two universes we actually live!
Perhaps cheap universes is our ultimate window on free will. Provided we
firmly decide to follow whichever course of action it chooses for us, we are
free to populate both branches of the Universal superposition. In whichever
branch we perceive ourselves to be, we have made the free choice of letting
quantum phenomena decide for us. Of course, I am not seriously suggesting
that free will did not exist until the inception of cheap universes, just as Bell
(1990) was not serious when he asked if “the wavefunction of the world [was]
waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living
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creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer, for some better
qualified system. . . with a PhD?”!
9 Conclusion
In this essay, we have penned down for the first time our beliefs concerning
the Universe in which we live, even though one of us (Brassard) has been
inhabited by these thoughts for several decades. The more time goes by,
the more convinced we are that they constitute the most rational explana-
tion for our quantum world. We reject violently the notion that there would
be a quantum-classical boundary and that physics is discontinuous, with a
reversible (even unitary) evolution at the microscopic level but an irreversible
collapse at the macroscopic level of measurements. It may be that free will
can at best be an illusion in a world ruled by the Strong Church of the Larger
Hilbert Space because every time you think that you make a decision (pro-
vided you use the services of cheap universes or some other source of true
quantum randomness to make your choices), you also make the complemen-
tary decision in the Universal superposition. However, what does it matter if
free will does not truly exist, provided the illusion is perfect? 14
We give the last words of wisdom to Bell (1990), who ended his Summary
of “Against ‘measurement’ ” by:
I mean [. . . ] by serious, that apparatus should not be separated off from the rest of
the world into black boxes, as if it were not made of atoms and not ruled by quantum
mechanics.
Perhaps it’s all nonsense, E pur si muove!
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